Troy Cooper v. Michelle Diggs by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-11-2011 
Troy Cooper v. Michelle Diggs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Troy Cooper v. Michelle Diggs" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1461. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1461 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2819 
 ___________ 
 
 TROY COOPER, 
 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
MICHELLE DIGGS, Physician Assistant; CHRIS MEYERS, Physician Assistant; 
LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendant; ROXANNE BURGWINKEL; CINDY AULTMAN, 
Nurse; STEVE CRISTINI, Counselor; MARK CAPOZZA, Deputy Superintendant; 
JOE BROWN, LPN 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-07-cv-01557) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Amy Reynolds Hay (by consent) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 11, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Troy Cooper, a prisoner in the custody of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
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proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from orders finding in favor of the defendants.  
For the following reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I.  
As we write primarily for the parties, we recount only the essential substantive and 
procedural facts.  Cooper alleges that he suffered retaliation and other violations of his 
constitutional rights for complaining about poor medical care he received as an inmate at 
SCI Greene.  Two incidents form the basis for the bulk of his complaint: 1) on March 22, 
2006, medical treatment of Cooper’s debilitating asthma attack was allegedly delayed for 
two hours as payback for his filing of grievances, see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ II:A1–19; 
and 2) on July 3, 2007, he was denied access to medical services both prior to and during 
an asthma attack, again allegedly as payback for filing grievances, see Second Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ II:A20–46.  Cooper also claimed that he was denied 90-day Program Review 
Committee (“PRC”) reviews in connection with his confinement to the facility’s 
Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”)1
                                                 
1 The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections establishes a 90-day review policy for 
inmates held in administrative custody.  See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections, Administrative Custody Procedures DC-ADM 802 § 2(D)(5) (2008), 
available at 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/document/919463/802_administrative_cust
ody_procedures_pdf.  
 by facility staff who also retaliated against him by 
filing false reports, denying him privileges, and interfering with his correspondence and 
grievances.  See Second Am. Compl ¶¶ II:A47–60.   
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Cooper initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in November 2007, claiming violations 
of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and also charging the existence of 
a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.2  The named defendants were two 
independent contractors, Physician’s Assistants Michelle Howard-Diggs and Chris 
Meyer, and six Department of Corrections employees: nurse Cindy Aultman, Licensed 
Practical Nurse Joe Brown, Registered Nurse Roxanne Burgwinkel, counselor Steve 
Cristini, Deputy Superintendant Mark Capozza, and Superintendant Louis Folino.  An 
additional defendant, nurse supervisor Mary Reese, passed away shortly after 
commencement and was removed from the case.  See Mem. Order, ECF No. 85.  All 
defendants were sued in their individual capacities; Folino, Reese, and Capozza were also 
sued in their official capacities.  Cooper asked for injunctive relief (in the form of 
mandating asthma preparedness in the RHU infirmary and ensuring the absence of 
treatment delay in the case of an asthma attack),3
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  In an opinion issued June 24, 2009, the District Court considered these motions 
to dismiss in tandem with its screening responsibilities under the Prison Litigation 
 compensatory damages, and punitive 
damages. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 Cooper twice amended his complaint.  References to the complaint throughout this 
opinion, unless otherwise specified, are to the second amended complaint filed on 
September 28, 2008 (ECF No. 96).  
 
3 Cooper’s requests for injunctive relief are moot, as he was transferred to SCI Camp Hill 
4 
 
Reform Act (“PLRA”).  While generally finding that Cooper had adequately stated a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, the District Court held that his allegations of 
conspiracy were “conclusory and lacking sufficient factual heft . . . to withstand the 
motions to dismiss,” and therefore required dismissal.  Cooper v. Diggs, No. 07-1557, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53958, at *21 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2009) (citing Rose v. Bartle, 
871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989)).  It also determined that Cooper had failed to allege 
sufficient personal involvement by defendant Folino to maintain the claim against him.  
Id. at *16–17.  Lastly, the court invoked its screening responsibilities, holding sua sponte 
that Cooper lacked a liberty interest in being free from disciplinary or administrative 
confinement, and could thus not sustain his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due 
process claim against defendants Capozza and Cristini regarding the denial of 90-day 
PRC review.  Id. at *21–26.  In summary, the District Court dismissed the conspiracy 
claims against all defendants, dismissed all claims against Folino, and dismissed the due-
process claims against Capozza and Cristini; all other claims remained.  
The defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the District 
Court on June 4, 2010.  Cooper v. Diggs, No. 07-1557, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54967, at 
*38 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2010).  Cooped filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II.  
 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We conduct  plenary 
review of both dismissals for failure to state a claim—whether under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
                                                                                                                                                             
on March 14, 2010. 
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12(b)(6) or under the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act—and 
orders granting summary judgment.  Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 
184 (3d Cir. 2009); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  In order to withstand a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint must contain a “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “a demand for the relief sought,”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a), but it must be more than a formulaic recitation or a conclusory statement of the 
defendant’s culpability.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009); 
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 263 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010).  All well-pleaded 
allegations and inferences drawn therefrom are to be construed in favor of the plaintiff.  
Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 180.   
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and products of discovery 
“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).  Although we view the facts and 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “if the 
evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment should be 
granted.”  Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted).   
III. 
 For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we will affirm its 
judgment with regard to defendants Aultman, Brown, Burgwinkel, Folino, Howard-
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Diggs, Meyer, and Reese, and with regard to Cooper’s conspiracy claim against Capozza 
and Cristini.  However, for the following reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment with regard to Cooper’s procedural due-process and retaliation claims against 
Capozza and Cristini and remand for further proceedings. 
 In his complaint, Cooper alleged that Capozza and Cristini denied him 90-day 
reviews of his confinement in the RHU, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right 
to procedural due process.  Significantly, although Cooper stated that he was held in the 
RHU for 17 months without review, he did not discuss the conditions in the RHU as part 
of his complaint.  The District Court sua sponte dismissed the claim, holding that his 
assignment to the RHU from September 15, 2006, until February 7, 2008, without PRC 
review could not, as a matter of law, violate his due-process rights.  
 Under the standard established in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), due 
process is required in situations where deprivation of a state-created liberty interest 
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”  Id. at 484.  The length of confinement is but one of the 
considerations in evaluating whether the restraint imposes such hardship; “[i]n deciding 
whether a protected liberty interest exists under Sandin, we consider the duration of the 
disciplinary confinement and the conditions of that confinement in relation to other 
prison conditions.”  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis 
added).  In Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997), we undertook an analysis of 
“the conditions experienced by Griffin in administrative custody” before determining that 
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his “exposure to the conditions of administrative custody for periods as long as 15 
months . . . did not deprive him of a liberty interest and that he was not entitled to 
procedural due process protection.”  Id. at 706, 708.   
While Cooper’s failure to present additional facts in his complaint prevented the 
District Court from analyzing the conditions of his confinement, he did discuss the 
conditions of his confinement in his post-dismissal motion for reconsideration, 
complaining of constant lighting, limited exercise, cold showers, denial of legal 
assistance, and deprivation of visitation.  Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. to Alter 8, ECF No. 
128.  He has continued to do so, most recently in his appellate brief.  While those 
conditions may not suffice as a matter of law, “given this case’s procedural posture and 
the fact that [Cooper] prepared his complaint pro se, the record is not sufficiently 
developed for us to determine whether there were other features of [his] confinement that 
meaningfully distinguished his situation from that in Griffin” and other cases.  Mitchell, 
318 F.3d at 532.  Accordingly, we will vacate and remand on this claim. 
With regard to retaliation, Cooper claimed that his right to be seen by the PRC 
“was deliberately denied to [him] . . . in retaliation for complaints and grievances 
submitted against defendant Cristini.”  Second Am. Compl. ¶ II:A48.  He also alleged 
that Capozza and Cristini refused to process the grievances he filed and deliberately 
falsified his records with the aim of denying him privileges; Cooper maintains that he 
only obtained acknowledgment of his grievances when he was able to slip 
correspondence out of prison through another inmate.  The District Court acknowledged 
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the existence of this claim, see Cooper, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53958, at *3–4, which 
appeared to survive the motion to dismiss.  See June 24, 2009, Order, ECF No. 118 
(granting the motion to dismiss as to all conspiracy claims and as to all claims against 
Defendant Folino, but denying it in all other respects); see also Mot. to Compel Disc. 2, 
ECF No. 138 (in which Cooper emphasized that the District Court had “not dismiss[ed] 
defendant Cristini as a party defendant”).  
Nevertheless, Capozza and Cristini believed that they had been constructively 
dismissed from the suit.  In a response to Cooper’s motion to compel, they argued that 
since “it was determined that [Cooper] had no due process right to a 90-day review . . . 
[his] retaliation claim against Cristini and Capozza would necessarily fail as . . . [he] 
suffered no adverse action that would be required to sustain a claim of retaliation.”  Resp. 
in Opp’n to Mot. to Compel ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 139.4
To the extent that Cooper sued Capozza in his official capacity, the claim should 
have been dismissed.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  
  This is a misstatement of the 
governing standard, as “government actions, which standing alone do not violate the 
Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a 
desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.”  Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2000).   
                                                 
4 Later, the defendants declared that, following dismissal, “no claims against Capozzi 
[sic] and Cristini remain.”  Concise Statement of Material Facts ¶ 14, ECF No. 153 
(emphasis added). 
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Otherwise, it appears that this retaliation claim against Capozza and Cristini was simply 
lost somewhere between the District Court’s order granting partial dismissal and its order 
granting summary judgment.5
                                                 
5 In our December 2, 2010, order, we specifically asked the parties to address “[w]hether 
the District Court improperly overlooked the First Amendment retaliation claims against 
defendants Cristini and Capozza.”  The parties do not appear to have done so. 
  We will therefore vacate and remand on this claim as well.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
  
